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Abstract—Physical layer security (PLS) is critically important
for emerging wireless communication networks to maintain the
confidentiality of the information of legitimate users. In this
paper, we investigate enhancing PLS in an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) based communication network where a UAV acting
as an aerial base station (BS) provides coverage in a densely
packed user area (such as a stadium or a concert area). In
particular, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) together
with highly-directional multi-antenna transmission techniques in
mmWave frequency bands are utilized for improving spectral
efficiency. In order to achieve PLS against potential eavesdropper
attacks, we introduce a protected zone around the user region.
However, limited resource availability refrain protected zone
being extended to cover the entire eavesdropper region. Hence,
we propose an approach to optimize the protected zone shape
(for fixed area) at each UAV-BS hovering altitude. The associated
secrecy performance is evaluated considering the secrecy outage
and sum secrecy rates. Numerical results reveal the importance
of protected zone shape optimization at each altitude to maximize
NOMA secrecy rates.
Index Terms—5G, drone, HPPP, mmWave, non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA), physical layer security (PLS), UAV.
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of deploying unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) based communication networks during temporary
events and after disasters to provide on-demand coverage and
enhance capacity has recently been explored in some real word
deployments and field trials [1], [2]. In order to reap maximum
benefits from such networks, enhancing the spectral efficiency
(SE) is essential. To that end, integrating non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA) transmission to UAVs acting as
aerial base stations (BSs) can be an effective solution [3], [4].
While enhancing the SE with NOMA, it is equally important
to guarantee the confidentiality of communication going on
between UAV-BS and legitimate users. Hence, introducing
appropriate physical layer security (PLS) techniques to such
networks become paramount importance.
A UAV based mobile cloud computing system is proposed
in [5] where UAVs offer computation offloading opportunities
to mobile stations (MS) with limited local processing capa-
bilities. In that, just for offloading purposes between a UAV
and the MSs, NOMA is proposed as one viable solution. In
our earlier work [3], [4], NOMA transmission is introduced
to UAVs acting as aerial BSs to provide coverage over a
stadium or a concert scenario. In particular, leveraging multi-
antenna techniques a UAV-BS generates directional beams, and
multiple users are served within the same beam employing
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NOMA transmission. In [3], assuming the availability of user
distance information, a beam scanning strategy is proposed
to maximize NOMA sum rates whereas in [4] we study the
performance of different feedback schemes for NOMA.
PLS in wireless communication networks has recently at-
tracted significant attention [6]–[8]. One of the main objectives
of the PLS is to increase the performance gap of the link
quality between the legitimate user and that of the eavesdrop-
per (Eve) by exploiting the physical properties of the wireless
medium [9]. To enhance the PLS in wireless ad-hoc networks,
artificial noise (AN) aided multi-antenna transmission strat-
egy is proposed in [6]. In [7], a protected zone is defined
surrounding the transmitter along with beamforming and AN
transmission to enhance the PLS in a multi-input-single-output
(MISO) communication system. Within the protected zone it
is guaranteed that no Eve exists. Considering single antenna
and multi-antenna scenarios, PLS with NOMA transmission
in large-scale networks is investigated in [8]. In particular, for
single antenna scenario Eve exclusion area is proposed while
for multi-antenna scenario AN generation towards undesired
directions is introduced to enhance PLS.
In this paper, we consider a similar scenario as in [3], [4],
where a UAV-BS is employed to provide broadband connectiv-
ity over a densely packed user area in a stadium. NOMA along
with multi-antenna transmission is then introduced to improve
the SE. In particular, we consider there are Eves outside of the
user area trying to breach communication going on between
legitimate users and UAV-BS. In order to enhance the PLS
of the UAV based communication network, we introduce a
protected zone around the user area [7], [8]. However, due
to physical constraints, protected zone may not be able to
eliminate all the Eves distributed within the area. Hence, we
propose an approach to optimize the protected zone shape
based on UAV-BS hovering altitude such that the achievable
NOMA sum secrecy rates are maximized.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Overview
We consider a mmWave-NOMA transmission scenario
where a single UAV-BS equipped with an M element uniform
linear array (ULA) is serving single-antenna users in the DL.
We assume that all the users lie inside a specific user region
as shown in Fig. 1. A 3-dimensional (3D) beam is generated
by the UAV-BS which entirely covers the user region. We
assume that there are K users in total, and the users can be
represented by the set NU = {1, 2, . . .K}. The user region
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Fig. 1: System scenario where NOMA transmission serves multiple
users simultaneously in a single DL beam.
is identified by an inner-radius L1, an outer-radius L2, and
the angle ∆, which is the fixed angle within the projection
of horizontal propagation pattern of UAV-BS on the xy-plane.
Note that it is possible to reasonably model various different
hot spot scenarios such as a stadium, concert hall, traffic jam,
and urban canyon by modifying these control parameters.
We assume that although the user region is free from
eavesdroppers, the surrounding region includes Eves trying to
intercept the transmission between UAV-BS and the legitimate
users. We designate the bounded region around the user region,
which includes Eves as Eve region. Similar to the user region,
we identify the Eve region by the same inner radius L1, an
outer radius LmaxE (greater than L2), and ∆
max
E (greater than
∆), as shown in Fig. 1. We assume KE Eves in total, which
are represented by the set NE = {1, 2, . . .KE}. Note that
horizontal footprint of the UAV-BS beam pattern covers the
Eve region (so that any Eve has nonzero channel to UAV-BS),
as well, but the coverage over Eve region might be provided
by the side lobes depending on the specific radiation pattern.
B. Location Distribution and mmWave Channel Model
We assume that users and Eves are uniformly, ran-
domly distributed within their specified regions follow-
ing homogeneous Poisson point process (HPPP) with the
densities λ and λE, respectively. The number of users
(Eves) in the user (Eve) region is therefore Poisson
distributed, i.e., P(k users in the user region) = µ
ke−µ
k! with
µ= (L22−L21)∆2 λ.
We assume that all the users have line-of-sight (LoS) paths
since i) UAV-BS is hovering at relatively high altitudes, and
ii) LoS path is much stronger than non-LoS (NLoS) paths in
mmWave frequency band [3], [10]. The channel hk between
the k-th user and the UAV-BS is therefore given as
hk =
√
M
αka(θk)[
PL
(√
d2k + h
2
)]1/2 , (1)
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Fig. 2: Footprint of protected zone represented by angle-distance pair
(∆E, LE), which is free from any eavesdroppers.
where h, dk, αk and θk represent UAV-BS hovering altitude,
horizontal distance between k-th user and UAV-BS, small scale
fading gain (i.e., complex Gaussian with CN (0, 1)), and angle-
of-departure (AoD), respectively. In addition, a(θk) is the
steering vector associated with AoD θk, and PL (x) represents
the path loss (PL) over the distance x. Note that the channel
between `-th Eve in the Eve region (i.e., `∈NE) and UAV-BS
can also be given using (1).
C. Protected Zone Approach for Physical Layer Security
The overall transmission scheme between the UAV-BS and
legitimate users presented in Fig. 1 is highly prone to the Eve
attacks, and the PLS is accordingly impaired. In this study,
we consider protected zone approach to enhance the secrecy
rates of the network [7], [8]. In the proposed approach, an
additional area (i.e., protected zone) around the user region
(and inside the Eve region) has been cleared from Eves by
means of some measures, as shown Fig. 2. This protected
area is actually a fraction of the complete Eve region, and we
denote this fraction by q with q≤ 1. Note that since clearing
Eves in the protected zone requires certain resources being
spent on the ground, our goal is to keep this area as small as
possible. In addition, we consider to optimize the shape of the
protected zone to enhance secrecy rates while keeping its area
the same, which is the main problem we tackle in this study.
The protected zone can be represented by an angle-
distance (radius) pair (∆E, LE) with ∆minE ≤∆E≤∆maxE and
L1≤LE≤LmaxE . Note that ∆minE is the minimum angle value
which occurs when LE =LmaxE . We can therefore represent
∆minE as follows
∆minE =
q
[(
(LmaxE )
2−L21
)
∆maxE − (L22−L21)∆
]
(LmaxE )
2−L22
. (2)
As sketched in Fig. 2, it is possible to have different shapes
for protected zone for a fixed q value. Note that whenever we
have ∆E≤∆, LE should be sufficiently greater than L2 (e.g.,
“Protected Zone I” in Fig. 2) to have a nonzero protected zone.
When ∆≤∆E≤∆maxE , LE might however be smaller (e.g.,
“Protected Zone II” in Fig. 2) or greater than L2 depending on
the area of the user region and particular q choice. Specifically,
LE can be parametrically expressed as follows
L2E =L
2
2+
q
∆E
[(
(LmaxE )
2−L21
)
∆maxE − (L22−L21)∆
]
, (3)
for ∆minE ≤∆E≤∆. Whenever we have ∆<∆E≤∆maxE ,
L2E=L
2
1+
q
∆E
[(
(LmaxE )
2−L21
)
∆maxE +
1−q
q
(L22−L21)∆
]
, (4)
provided L2E≥L22, and LE is otherwise expressed as
L2E =L
2
1+
q
∆E−∆
[(
(LmaxE )
2−L21
)
∆maxE −(L22−L21)∆
]
. (5)
III. SECURE NOMA FOR UAV-BS DOWNLINK
In this section, we consider NOMA transmission in UAV-BS
downlink (DL) to enhance the SE, and evaluate the associated
secrecy rates in the presence of protected zone.
A. Secrecy Outage and Sum Secrecy Rates
We assume that UAV-BS generates a beam b where the
respective projection in the azimuth domain is in the direction
of θ with θ∈ [0, 2pi] [3]. Assuming critically spaced array,
the effective channel gain of user k∈NU for beamforming
direction θ can be given using (1) as follows [3], [4]
|hHk b|2 ≈
|αk|2
M × PL
(√
d2k + h
2
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
sin
(
piM(θ−θk)
2
)
sin
(
pi(θ−θk)
2
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
=
|αk|2
PL
(√
d2k + h
2
)FM (pi[θ − θk]), (6)
where FM (·) is the Feje´r kernel. Similarly, the effective
channel gain of the most detrimental Eve, gE is given as,
gE = max
kE∈NE
|hHkEb|2 (7)
where hkE is the channel gain of the kE-th Eve.
When deriving secrecy rates in NOMA transmission, we
assume that UAV-BS knows the effective channel gains of
desired users while those of Eves are unknown. Without any
loss of generality, we also assume that the users in set NU are
already indexed from the best to the worst with respect to their
effective channel gains as represented by (6). Defining βk to
be the power allocation coefficient of k-th user, we therefore
have β1≤ . . . ≤βK such that
∑K
k=1 β
2
k = 1. The transmitted
signal is generated by superposition coding as
x =
√
PTxb
K∑
k=1
βksk, (8)
where PTx and sk are the total DL transmit power and k-th
user’s message, respectively. The received signal at the k-th
user is then given as
yk = hHk x + vk =
√
PTxhHk b
K∑
k=1
βksk + vk, (9)
where vk is zero-mean complex Gaussian additive white noise
with variance N0.
With the received signal as in (9) in hand, each user first
decodes messages of all weaker users (allocated with larger
power) sequentially in the presence of stronger users’ mes-
sages (allocated with smaller power). Those decoded messages
are then subtracted from the received signal in (9), and each
user decodes its own message treating the stronger users’
messages as noise. This overall decoding process is known
as successive interference cancellation (SIC), and k-th user
decodes its own message after SIC with the following SINR:
SINRk =
PTx|hHk b|2β2k
(1− δk1)PTx
k−1∑
l=1
|hHk b|2β2l +N0
, (10)
where δk1 is the Kronecker delta function taking 1 if k= 1,
and 0 otherwise. Assuming that Eves have powerful detection
capability [6], [8], the most detrimental Eve decodes k-th user
message with the SINR given as
SINREk =
PTxβ
2
kgE
(1− δk1)PTx
k−1∑
l=1
β2l gE +N
E
0
, (11)
where NE0 is the associated noise variance.
Considering SINR in (10), the instantaneous rate at k-
th user is given by RNOMAk = log2(1 + SINRk). Similarly,
considering (11), the instantaneous rate at the most detri-
mental Eve for decoding the k-th user message is given
as RNOMAk,E = log2(1 + SINR
E
k ). The secrecy rate for k-th
legitimate user can therefore be given as [8], [11]
CNOMAk =
[
RNOMAk −RNOMAk,E
]+
, (12)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. As (12) implies, the secrecy rates
are always strictly positive [12].
Assuming that Rk denotes desired secrecy rate for the
user k∈NU, we define the secrecy outage event occurring
whenever CNOMAk <Rk with the respective secrecy outage
probability Pok = P{CNOMAk <Rk}. As a result, outage sum
secrecy rate with NOMA transmission can be given as
RNOMA =
K∑
k=1
(1− Pok)Rk. (13)
For performance comparison, we also consider outage sum
secrecy rate with OMA transmission.
B. Shape Optimization for Protected Zone
In this section, we discuss optimization of the protected
zone shape to enhance the secrecy rates while keeping its
area (i.e., q) the same. We note that any particular subregion
within the Eve region does not equally impair the achievable
secrecy rates even if the subregion areas are the same and the
Eves are equally capable. This is basically due to the varying
effective channel gain between UAV-BS and Eve with different
subregions, which is a function of not only the distance but
also the relative angle (i.e., angle offset from the beamforming
direction) associated with each Eve.
Considering (12), the subregion involving the most detri-
mental Eve has the largest impact on the secrecy rates. Hence,
instead of choosing the subregions arbitrarily to form the
protected zone, it is more meaningful to include (i.e., protect)
subregions which result in better effective channel gain for
potential eavesdroppers, and hence is likely to involve the most
detrimental Eve.
As we will show in Section IV-A, the location distribution of
the most detrimental Eve depends also on the hovering altitude
of UAV-BS. In particular, the most detrimental Eve is likely
to be present in a subregion where ∆E≥∆ and LE≤L2,
which is represented by “Protected Zone II” in Fig. 2, when
the altitude is low. In contrast, the region including the most
detrimental Eve becomes closer to “Protected Zone I” of
Fig. 2 with ∆E≤∆ and LE≥L2 when the altitude is high.
We therefore conclude that the shape of the protected zone
should be optimized taking into account the UAV-BS hovering
altitude. Hence, at a particular altitude and for a given q, the
optimal shape of the protected zone can be identified as
∆∗E, L
∗
E = argmax
∆E, LE
RNOMA (14)
s.t. ∆minE ≤ ∆E ≤ ∆maxE ,
LE is computed by (3)−(5),
where RNOMA is given in (13).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to show
the importance of shape optimization of the protected zone
and its impact on the achievable sum secrecy rates with
varying UAV-BS hovering altitudes. Considering Fig. 1,
we assume that L2 = 100 m, L1 = 25 m, LmaxE = 1.5L2 m,
∆ = 0.02 rad (1.145◦), ∆maxE = 2∆, θ¯= 0
◦, and M = 100. User
distribution is based on HPPP with λ= 1, and user target
secrecy rates are Rj = 4 bits per channel use (BPCU) and
Ri = 1 BPCU, respectively. The power allocation ratios are
β2j = 0.25 and β
2
i = 0.75 while PTx = 10 dBm and N0 = −
35 dBm. We assume two user NOMA transmission with
j= 1 and i= 20 after ordering users with respect to their
effective channel gains. The path-loss model is assumed to be
PL(
√
d2k + h
2) = 1+
(√
d2k + h
2
)γ
with γ= 2 [4], [10], and
the UAV-BS altitude is h∈ [10, 150] m.
A. Location of the Most Detrimental Eavesdropper
We present the angle and distance distributions of the
location of the most detrimental Eve in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4,
respectively, for two different altitudes of h= {10, 100}m, and
HPPP densities of λE = {0.1, 1}. In Fig. 3, we observe that
the most detrimental Eve is very likely to have a relative angle
which is greater than ∆2 at a lower altitude of h= 10 m. In
particular, relative angle of the most detrimental Eve exceeds
∆
2 all the time for λE = 1 while it drops to approximately 70%
of the time for λE = 0.1. When the altitude becomes higher
(i.e., h= 100 m), the relative angle of most detrimental Eve
becomes smaller than ∆2 . In Fig. 4, we observe that the PL
distance of the most detrimental Eve is smaller (greater) than
100 m at lower (higher) altitudes, i.e., h= 10 m (h= 100 m).
We therefore conclude that the most detrimental Eve tends to
have larger relative angles and smaller PL distances at lower
altitudes in comparison to those at higher altitudes.
B. Impact of the Protected Zone Shape on Secrecy Rates
In Fig. 5, we depict the sum secrecy rates along with the
protected zone angle (i.e., ∆E) at altitudes of h= {10, 100}m
assuming q= 0.2. We observe that while the secrecy rates get
maximized at ∆E ≈ 1.7◦ (> ∆) for h= 10 m, the optimal
angle turns out to be ∆E ≈ 0.7◦ (< ∆) at h= 100 m. This
observation is consistent with the discussion in Section IV-A
in the sense that the most detrimental Eve has a relative angle
greater (smaller) than ∆2 at low (high) altitudes.
Similarly, Fig. 6 presents the secrecy rates along with the
protected zone distance (i.e., LE) for the same settings as of
Fig. 5. We observe that while the optimal distance maximizing
the secrecy rates is LE≈ 110 m at h= 10 m, it turns out to
be LE≈ 145 m at h= 100 m. As before, this observation also
nicely agrees with our discussions in Section IV-A regarding
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the distance distribution of the most detrimental Eve. This
shows the importance of optimizing the protected zone shape
at different hovering altitudes to maximize sum secrecy rates.
C. Secrecy Rates Variation with Altitude
In Fig. 7, we present sum secrecy rates of NOMA and OMA
transmission along with varying altitude of h∈ [10, 150] m
and for different protected zone sizes (i.e., q ∈{0, 0.2, 0.5}).
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For a nonzero protected zone (i.e., q 6= 0), considering shape
optimization as discussed in Section III-B, sum secrecy rates
are identified. In addition, Fig. 7 also captures sum secrecy
rate variation with q= 0.2 for a fixed shape (optimal shape
at h= 10 m). As can be observed, the fixed protected zone
shape yields sum secrecy rates comparable to that of optimized
protected zone shape only around h= 10 m and performs
worse at all the other altitudes. Further, we observe that the
secrecy rates improve if large portion of the Eve region can
be covered by the protected zone (i.e., q increases). Based on
the target sum secrecy rate and the operational altitude, the
smallest q can also be determined. By this way, the desired
secrecy rates can be achieved optimally by designating less
area as the protected zone which would relieve the burden of
clearing any unnecessary region free from Eves. Note also that
the secrecy rates associated with NOMA is much larger than
those of OMA especially at lower altitudes.
In Fig. 8, variation of the optimal shape of the protected
zone is captured for q= 0.2, 0.5. In particular, Fig. 8a shows
the optimal angle, ∆∗E variation whereas Fig. 8b depicts opti-
mal distance L∗E variation with UAV-BS hovering altitude. As
can be observed from Fig. 8, ∆∗E decreases with altitude (see
Fig. 8a) while L∗E increases with altitude (see Fig. 8b). This
observation aligns nicely with the discussion in Section IV-A
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Here q= 0.2, 0.5.
which tells us that at lower altitudes the most detrimental
Eve tends to have a larger relative angle and smaller distance
whereas at higher altitudes this is vice versa.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy rates of UAV
based mmWave communication network considering NOMA
transmission. In particular, we consider protected zone ap-
proach to enhance the secrecy rates. Towards this end, we
first investigate the distribution of the location of the most
detrimental Eve which impairs secrecy rates the most. We
then consider the protected zone which is free from any Eve,
and the associated optimal shape of it to enhance the secrecy
performance. We show that the optimal shape of the protected
zone should cover the most detrimental Eve. In addition, we
also show that the optimal shape highly relies on the UAV-BS
hovering altitude such that the protected zone should be wider
(narrower) in angle and shorter (longer) in distance at lower
(higher) altitudes.
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